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In 1962, the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI), founded in 1861, sent an expedition to excavate the site of Afyeh, located in the region of Lower Nubia in southern Egypt. This institution of the British Raj, responsible for archaeological research and the preservation of monuments in India, had no history of working in the country, and its expedition to Egypt was never repeated. Nevertheless, in this article I highlight how this isolated excavation illustrates changing geographies of scientific knowledge in the era of the Cold War and non-alignment. Thinking through the ASI’s work, I explain how the making of the past in non-aligned countries like India and Egypt articulated with changing relations of regional and global power. I also explain how this work made new visions of, and global hierarchies of expertise in, the scientific understanding of the past possible.             
The ASI’s work in Egypt is tied to a narrative of post-war modernisation and preservation work. The occasion for the institution’s presence in the country was UNESCO’s International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia, launched in March 1960 in response to Egypt’s construction of the Aswan High Dam. The Dam’s floodwaters would submerge the contiguous border regions of Egyptian and Sudanese Nubia, both located to the structure’s south. Whilst the Egyptian and Sudanese governments made plans to move the populations impacted by the deluge, the official narrative relates that, after formal invitation from both bodies, UNESCO launched its campaign in a bid to ensure not only that ancient temples located in Nubia might be preserved from submersion, but also that large-scale archaeological survey, excavation, and epigraphic work could take place in the region before the waters hit. In this narrative, the ASI’s mission travelled to Egypt to contribute to this effort, one amongst many other international teams to do so.​[1]​ 
Recently, critical attention has been paid to UNESCO’s Nubian campaign, which officially ended in 1980, and which is heavily entangled in the mythology of the development of the 1972 World Heritage Convention.​[2]​ Lucia Allais has noted how UNESCO used the campaign to help instigate ‘a new space for cultural action, by weaving material and architectonic values into patterns of mobility for knowledge, people, and capital’. She has also noted how the campaign was predominantly a Cold War undertaking, to a great extent a United States response to Soviet technicians helping to build the High Dam.​[3]​ Yet in practice—and particularly taking into consideration the archaeological work that took place—the Nubian campaign was not so straightforward as even this nuanced account demonstrates. UNESCO’s reach was not as powerful as appearances often suggested, and the campaign can be thought about in ways that question the interpretation of events during the work as resulting predominantly from a bipolar Cold War opposition between America and the Soviet Union. 
America may have been ‘the world’s leader at decolonising’, never missing a chance to further its interests in former colonies through the mobilisation of aid money and technical expertise.​[4]​ As the ASI’s presence in Nubia shows, however, the work in newly independent Egypt and Sudan was connected to concerns beyond those involved in the traditional Cold War dichotomy, even as it is tempting to attribute the Nubian campaign’s work predominantly to post-war bipolarity.​[5]​ As Allais states, the US government provided the greatest part of the funding to help offset the cost of moving the temples located in Nubia (those at Abu Simbel and Philae amongst them). Continuing a situation that had long been the case under colonial rule, meanwhile, archaeological missions from the US and NATO-aligned Western Europe also carried out the largest proportion of the campaign’s survey and excavation work.​[6]​ Such bipolar solidarity was not entirely the rule, however. Not only did disagreements take place between teams from “Western” nations involved in the campaign, but several years of work in Nubia had already been carried out before US funding for the temple movements was finalised.​[7]​ Meanwhile, the ASI’s presence in Egypt—not to mention the way in which Egypt undermined UNESCO procedures in order to help bring that presence about—suggests that international connections strengthened or forged through non-alignment could help not only to complicate the bipolar characteristics of the work, but also to alter the colonial hierarchies related to the construction of scientific knowledge about the past that UNESCO’s exploitation of western funding sources helped to perpetuate.   
In order to explain how this situation developed, I examine the ASI’s excavation in Nubia, considering how the institution’s work overlapped with India’s—and Egypt’s—position as a non-aligned nation-state seeking an international role at an explicit remove from such Cold War bipolarity. Contributing to recent discussions on the global circulation of scientific knowledge,​[8]​ this exploration allows me to illustrate the ways in which the post-war reassembly of global political geography articulated with a reassembly of global archaeological practice. It also articulates with recent work on independent India’s practices of cultural diplomacy, which, as Claire Wintle has noted in the case of displays of “India” in the United States, ‘require[d] human interaction beyond the nation’, and which invariably complicate such bounded geopolitical analysis.​[9]​
As formal decolonisation took place, the Cold War increased in resonance, and the non-aligned movement began to grow, so norms of archaeological knowledge construction found themselves being reassembled in ways that did not always fit into neatly arranged boxes, whether national, bipolar, or otherwise. The work carried out, and the knowledge generated, during UNESCO’s Nubian campaign might well seem emblematic of the Cold War context within which it took place. And the ASI’s work in Egypt might well seem attributable to a purely “Indian” cultural diplomacy. Using the institution’s own records to think through that work, however, suggests that other forms of post-war political (non-) alignment were equally relevant to the ways in which knowledge about the past now came into being.​[10]​ It also suggests that the dig—and the campaign itself—often constituted a genuine and historically conditioned ‘transnational event’,​[11]​ even as the transnational networks involved occasionally began to falter. In this article, I explain how this complex set of global political relationships conditioned the past at Afyeh both as it came into being and as it generated new archaeological possibilities elsewhere.      

India in the Post-War World

Why would an Indian archaeological expedition travel to Egypt? What motivated members of a formerly colonial institution to export that institution’s work outside India’s borders? In his preliminary field report, published some years after the dig at Afyeh had taken place, the archaeologist B. B. Lal, the ASI team’s director in Egypt, set out an explanation that chimed with the official narrative of post-independence India’s aims and sympathies in the world. He noted that ‘for any developing country, self-sufficiency is the basic key-note; and … the United Arab Republic is doing all it can to achieve the objective’.​[12]​ Continuing, he stated that ‘the construction of the High Dam will no doubt be beneficial’, even though ‘it has its repercussions too’. Thus, ‘ever willing to co-operate in all international schemes of merit, the Government of India … decided to send out an Archaeological Expedition to Lower Nubia’.​[13]​ Lal’s explanation reflected the multiple scales at which post-independence India prosecuted its place in the world, moving from national self-interest to support for international policies of modernisation and transnational networks of non-alignment and postcolonial solidarity. Ultimately, it was work across these scales—and a recognition of their historical contingency—that made the work at Afyeh happen, even as particular Indian policies suggested that the possibility of the undertaking might well have been self-evident from the start.     
	Above all, India had a strong relationship with Egypt (known, between 1958 and 1971, as the United Arab Republic). In 1961, the two nations had become founder members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Before that, in 1958, they had signed an Indo-U.A.R. Cultural Agreement in order ‘to bring into effect the principles of the Joint Communique [sic] issued on the occasion of the [1955] Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung’.​[14]​ Beyond Egypt, meanwhile, the Indian government similarly saw UNESCO as strategically important. In particular, the multilateralism that the Paris-based organisation represented could be used in order to assist the developing Afro-Asian movement and support the regional aims of India and Egypt alike.​[15]​ In 1954, Humayun Kabir, Secretary of India’s Ministry of Education, wrote to Luther Evans, UNESCO’s Director-General, in order to request that India be permitted to host the organisation’s ninth General Conference in New Delhi. Kabir stressed that no session of the event had previously been held east of the Mediterranean.​[16]​ And when, in 1956, that conference came to India, it opened with a speech by Nehru requesting that ‘the meeting of this organisation, in this ancient city of Delhi, will turn your minds more to the needs of these underdeveloped countries of the world’.​[17]​ Given such events, India’s work at Afyeh seems no less than predictable. 
The rhetoric of cultural agreements and general conferences, however, provides an imprecise explanation as to why the ASI went to Egypt. Indeed, as is often the case with such actions, files relating to the Indo-U.A.R. Cultural Agreement reveal a certain inactivity in regard to its implementation. One memo relates that the Indian government had been waiting a year for word from Cairo on a final programme of events.​[18]​ In a climate where agreements said one thing and practice suggested another, what specifically made it worthwhile, then, to send an Indian archaeological team to dig in Nubia? In a related context, Ahmad Shokr has hesitated to explain the construction of the Aswan High Dam simply in terms of the coarse category of “development”. Instead, he has tried ‘to understand the various forces that combined to make it a favourable development project’.​[19]​ Taking this frame into consideration, it is necessary to think beyond the official narrative of the Afyeh work and instead question why the Indian government might find a foreign archaeological mission a productive piece of diplomacy to sponsor in and of itself. What forces combined to make archaeology a favourable piece of Indian foreign policy?
	The answers to this question are entangled with the dying days of colonialism and the role of archaeology in and for India. B. B. Lal was a product of the field training school held by his institution at the site of Taxila (now in Pakistan) in 1944.​[20]​ The school took place under the directorship of the ASI’s last British director, the archaeologist Mortimer Wheeler, who had been employed to reform the institution’s practices. At Taxila, Wheeler aimed to inculcate a particular, highly regimented form of excavation practice amongst students; a former soldier, Wheeler was obsessed with discipline and order in the field. Despite his high-flung rhetoric and obsessive promotion of particular forms of archaeological visualisation, there was often little to distance the work that Wheeler undertook in India as different from that of his directorial predecessors, as Sudeshna Guha and Robin Boast have noted.​[21]​ Yet the ASI’s school at Taxila took on significance in the personal narratives of those Indian archaeologists who attended it, and who, after 1947, took over control of archaeology in the country. In his autobiography, B. B. Lal notes that for several years ‘very little was done after the departure of Wheeler in terms of training’. A connection with Wheeler, though, continued to produce dividends. Lal notes that the solution to these training issues meant that ‘in 1959 a School of Archaeology was founded under the auspices of the Survey and I was given the privilege of being its first Director’.​[22]​        
	Drawing on Taxila’s precedent, the new School of Archaeology’s programme was modelled after training conducted by the University of London’s Institute of Archaeology, which Wheeler and his former wife Tessa Verney Wheeler had worked together to found.​[23]​ Yet reworked for the era of Indian independence, the use of “British” archaeological pedagogy now took on a particular (and new) sense of national and regional urgency. In 1957, at a meeting of the country’s Central Advisory Board for Archaeology, India’s Minister of Education, Maulana Azad, had stated that ‘in 1947 there was an Englishman as Director [of the ASI]. I talked to him. The first point was whether we have got the necessary material if our Department were to open a school to give practical training’. Azad ruefully noted that ‘ten years have elapsed since then’.​[24]​ Meanwhile, the (now-renamed) Ministry of Education and Scientific Research also indicated the urgency of the proposed school, which ultimately employed Wheeler as an external examiner of its diploma.​[25]​ The Ministry published a memo which noted that, since independence, India had in fact run a limited scheme for training ‘outsiders’ in excavation practices. These outsiders included Indians with no affiliation to the ASI, but also included ‘persons from abroad’, including Burma, Cambodia, and China. The memo went on to suggest that the ability to attract foreigners ‘signifies that our Department of Archaeology has the best organised service at least in this part of the world’.​[26]​ 
Founding a School of Archaeology in India would correct a long-delayed state of affairs. That act would also indicate that the country constituted a regional centre of expertise in archaeological knowledge production. India could put this position to good use, establishing archaeology as a credible tool in strengthening the country’s chosen geopolitical role. Before the trip to Nubia, the ASI had already sent delegations to Indonesia (1948), Afghanistan (1956), and Nepal (during 1961–1962), all three founder members of the Non-Aligned Movement.​[27]​ Working through UNESCO’s multilateral auspices, however, the Indian government now sensed that it had a chance to strengthen this prominence in archaeology. That Wheeler himself had been co-opted on to certain of the Nubian campaign’s committees can only have bolstered this position.​[28]​ 




Before the Indian government could send anyone to Egypt, the ASI needed a site to excavate. Actually obtaining this site, however, was easier said than done. Despite UNESCO’s soaring rhetoric of international collaboration, India’s arrival in Egypt calls into question the extent to which the organisation had control over patterns of archaeological circulation established in Nubia,​[32]​ and illustrates that only through action at multiple scales could an event like the Afyeh excavation happen. At best, the process of organising excavation work in Egypt and Sudan was ad hoc, resembling more a process of bricolage than the sort of order that UNESCO liked to promote. In India’s case, this bricolage also became entangled with specific forms of archaeological knowledge. All archaeologists were equal, but the disarray and equivocation of the Nubian campaign helped the ASI’s archaeologists become more equal than others.   
	India’s initial communication with UNESCO took place at cross purposes. When Humayun Kabir wrote to Vittorino Veronese, he cautiously stated that India might provide 

technical assistance to the Egyptian government or UNESCO by loaning the services of some of our officers, if necessary at our own cost, or we might send a small survey party which could help the Egyptian government or UNESCO in exploration as well as excavation.​[33]​

As Veronese explained, though, this caution was unnecessary, because he was not in a position to provide Kabir with information as to whether these terms were acceptable. ‘UNESCO’s task’, he wrote, ‘is to be an intermediary between the two governments who have asked for help’.​[34]​ Lucia Allais has noted how UNESCO utilised the Nubian campaign to set itself up as ‘a mediating agency that enforces international standards’.​[35]​ Yet, as the organisation disowned its own agency, it is unclear whether or not UNESCO actually wanted—or was able—to enforce much of anything. The organisation forwarded Indian correspondence to Egypt, but at the same time it encouraged bilateral communication between the two countries, asking India to give further information to Egypt about the work it intended to carry out.​[36]​ Reinforcing the system of nation-states upon which multilateralism depended, UNESCO’s mediating role could often be extremely—and purposefully—limited. 
Even when it attempted to mediate, UNESCO was not a particularly convincing enforcer. Towards the end of 1960, Jean Thomas, the organisation’s Assistant Director-General, wrote to Humayun Kabir informing him that Egypt’s Department of Antiquities wanted India to conduct prehistoric work ‘when the general survey of the prehistoric sites of [Egyptian] Nubia is completed’. The problem was that this survey, a means of locating unknown (and not just prehistoric) sites that might entice interested countries to work in the region, had not yet been organised.​[37]​ Much of UNESCO’s work during the Nubian campaign existed in the realm of representation, the smoke and mirrors of the campaign’s spectacle making it appear as if the organisation was in total control.​[38]​ Yet in reality UNESCO bureaucrats often complained that they were out of the loop, and either had to or wanted to let countries like India get on with negotiating the specifics of the campaign’s archaeological work themselves.​[39]​ As the ASI’s work at Afyeh would reveal, the “Nubian past” that UNESCO asked people to excavate was never a settled entity.
This situation played into Indian policy. Towards the end of 1960, Humayun Kabir, B. B. Lal, and Amalananda Ghosh, the Director General of the ASI, visited Egypt as guests of the country’s Ministry of Education.​[40]​ The relationship blossomed and, by February 1961, Ghosh was communicating directly with Anwar Shoukry, Director General of the Egyptian Department of Antiquities. When he did so, he enquired after the Nubian archaeological survey and requested ‘a list of about half-a-dozen sites which you would suggest for our excavations’, pointedly stating that, ‘as I told you, we would like … a pre-Dynastic [pre-pharaonic] site with an associated cemetery’.​[41]​ This request taken into consideration, correspondence between UNESCO officials ended up summarising the process by which the ASI accepted Egypt’s offer of a concession at Afyeh.​[42]​ The only control UNESCO retained over the situation was financial, converting Indian Rupees into Egyptian Pounds to enable the ASI to carry out its work more easily.​[43]​ But despite even this power, to some extent the organisation faced a fait accompli. If UNESCO wanted countries like India to take part in the Nubian campaign—if it wanted to create the possibility of such archaeological circulation taking place—the organisation had to accept the limits of its control. And in this instance, it seemed that Egyptian-Indian cultural collaboration could actually be mobilised in the form of an archaeological project.    
	This situation also ruled other Nubian possibilities out, which suited the ASI but further undermined UNESCO’s authority. Alongside India, Pakistan had also expressed an interest in working in Nubia. Pre-partition, many of the archaeologists now employed by the Pakistani government had themselves been trained under Mortimer Wheeler’s directorship of the ASI. And that government, too, wanted to leverage the form of archaeological expertise at play into international impact in Nubia. Yet due to UNESCO policy Pakistan, like India, had been forced to wait for the results of the archaeological survey of Egyptian Nubia. This delay did not assist Pakistani aims.
In order to enforce the impression that the Nubian campaign constituted an event attuned to the tenets of multilateralism, UNESCO worked to set up consultative committees in conjunction with both the Egyptian and Sudanese governments. If and when they worked, the task of these committees was predominantly to offer advice on field operations.​[44]​ Through a decision-making procedure incorporating members from a number of different countries, the committees would necessarily enact the sort of opaque multilateralism that UNESCO wanted the Nubian campaign to represent: a situation whereby it became impossible to attribute choices to any entity beyond national (yet simultaneously international) committees themselves.​[45]​ Sometimes, though, this opacity worked against UNESCO’s interests. After receiving a letter from Karachi indicating that Pakistan’s archaeologists were interested in excavating a site ‘pertaining to the period 3000–1000 B.C.’,​[46]​ the United Arab Republic’s consultative committee had indicated that, like India, a Pakistani team should work on a site from Egypt’s Predynastic period. As one UNESCO employee pointed out, this suggestion seemed mistaken. The Predynastic was defined as the period of gradual Egyptian state formation prior to c. 3000 BC. But the date range given by M. Riyazur Rahman, Section Officer at the Pakistani Ministry of Education, in fact indicated a timespan running well into the later pharaonic period.​[47]​ The committee, though, had apparently been firm in its decision. To them, the combined experience of the proposed Pakistani team suggested an ability to excavate prehistoric sites ‘in the sense understood by Egyptologists’.​[48]​ It did not suggest an ability to excavate “historic”, pharaonic-era locales defined by their relationship with writing. 




Obscuring the genealogy of its presence in Egypt, at work in the field the ASI team did all it could to strengthen its plausibility as one amongst many excavating equals. Key to this outcome was routine and the representation of a job well done. True to Mortimer Wheeler’s (and archaeology’s) own form, this representation was strongly visual. Notable in material stemming from the Afyeh excavations is adherence not only to longstanding canons of archaeological illustration, but also to styles of illustration promoted ad absurdum by Wheeler himself. UNESCO promoted the Nubian campaign by associating it with technological innovation in recording technique.​[55]​ But much of the actual fieldwork carried out in the region relied on a combination of photographic and drawing methods that had been in operation for many years, often had colonial precedents, and which Lal and others were well aware of. 












At times, meanwhile, norms related to field personnel threatened to disrupt the smooth running of field work. Sometimes, this disruption was harmless: at the start of the work, Lal complained that the Indian Embassy in Cairo had not recruited an ‘Accountant-cum-Stenographer’ to the work, as had been the plan.​[63]​ At other times, however, this disruption points to the ways in which the intersecting gender and racial politics of excavation might actively throw into disarray the norms that UNESCO and other organisations now attempted to set forward. Throughout the ASI’s time in India, a running issue related to the team’s relationship with the labour force put under its control. Field labour had represented a long-term source of anxiety for archaeologists working in Egypt; manuals were published explaining how best to control field workers in a way that tallied with colonial-era anxieties relating to population control.​[64]​ Yet now those anxieties overlapped with the policies of the Indian government. 
As soon as he arrived in Cairo, Lal wrote to Amalananda Ghosh about ‘the great discontentment amongst the members of the staff regarding the very low rates of the daily allowances in Nubia’. Describing his ASI charges as ‘almost-starving’, Lal went on to explain that this situation threatened to undermine Egyptian norms: the Department of Antiquities had told him that excavation staff should be paid double the normal daily allowance when working in Nubia.​[65]​ But worse than that, a few days later, Lal revealed a further reason as to his concern over remuneration. He wrote that:    	 

I am enclosing herewith a copy of the correspondence which has passed between me and Dr. Shoukry regarding the employment of labour and a foreman in Nubia. It will be seen that even a foreman has to be paid at the rate of L.E. [Egyptian pounds] 1.50 per day. According to the rates now in force for Nubia … I will be getting [sic] at the rate of L.E. 1.75 per day and the other members of the delegation at the rate of L.E. 1.31 per day. Does the Government of India want us to live at the same standard as would the head labourer at the site?​[66]​

Paid less than their labourers, the ASI team’s position in a normative racial—and deeply masculine—hierarchy would be threatened. Yet try as he might (including sending multiple telegrams from Nubia itself),​[67]​ Lal could not fix the issue. The Indian Ministry of Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs (SRCA), now responsible for the ASI, denied his request to raise his team’s field allowances.​[68]​    	
	Worse still, the ASI had been granted a site concession that, at least given established norms of excavation in Egypt, appeared to give them little chance to display their credibility as archaeologists, further undermining personnel who were by now ‘greatly upset’.​[69]​ As originally agreed, the concession constituted a small settlement site and some grave tumuli, which the ASI spent about a month excavating.​[70]​ This situation made the secondary importance of prehistory in Egypt clear, and was a cause of some embarrassment. Realising how quickly the ASI’s work might finish, Lal sent a telegram to Ghosh (due to visit Egypt), asking him to: ‘please plan your visit earliest stop’.​[71]​ At the same time, undermining the committee structure put into place by UNESCO, Lal lobbied the Egyptian Department of Antiquities to provide further areas to excavate, apparently ‘not without great difficulty’.​[72]​ 
As a result—and indicating once again the contingency of the “Nubian past” that was actually to be excavated—the ASI team were granted permission to excavate a cemetery site located next to the nearby village of Tumas; they also surveyed the Nile terraces in their concession area.​[73]​ Notwithstanding that some of the new work provided ‘a great addition to our knowledge of the area’, a report from the field indicated the disappointment that the new site was ‘again a rather small one’.​[74]​ Ghosh, in addition to the Indian Ambassador to Egypt, visited the ASI’s work, ‘which gave much encouragement and pleasure to the team’.​[75]​ But this valedictory process of witnessing was at best a minor fillip. The ASI now had to labour hard to prove the value of the work that they had done to the government that had funded it.  Once again drawing on colonial-era forms of knowledge, a process that made Egyptian remains relevant to India now also helped to generate new, transnational possibilities for India itself.       

Mobile Pasts, Mobile Futures 

Proving this value was aided by the malleability of field routine related to the recording of archaeological sites and the division of objects excavated at them. During the archaeological survey of Egyptian Nubia, the team in charge actually made Afyeh “archaeological” by giving it an identification that fit within a scheme initially developed during previous survey work in the region. There had been two previous archaeological surveys of Egyptian Nubia, both administered by an Egyptian government under various forms of British influence or control. The first took place from 1907 until 1911, when Egypt was under British occupation. In that time, the original Aswan Dam, built during 1899–1902, had been heightened, raising the level of floodwaters in Nubia. The second survey was conducted from 1929 until 1934, after, in 1922, Britain had granted Egypt (strictly nominal) independence. In that period, the dam was raised again, flooding Nubia further. During these surveys, sites (mostly constituting cemeteries) had been organised into a sequential numbering pattern. The new survey, led by Britain’s Egypt Exploration Society, now adopted this format. As the survey’s leader noted in its report, the Society’s Field Director (and Professor of Egyptology at the University of London’s University College), W. B. Emery, had declared that the work ‘should be carried out according to the method evolved … for the original archaeological survey of Nubia’, albeit with certain changes.​[76]​ Emery had been in charge of the 1929–1934 survey, and saw little reason to break with tradition. Past work constituted future pasts. 
Yet this practice meant that, despite the campaign’s concentration on Nubia as a whole, the Society’s work lodged the sites it surveyed within particular, rather more national norms of registration: the second Nubian survey had finished at Cemetery 227, and the new survey started with Cemetery 228.​[77]​ An additional organisational scheme was developed for the settlements now increasingly of interest to prehistorians: the sites were themselves registered sequentially, in addition to being given an indicator relating to their presumed periodisation. For instance, the team designated Afyeh as Settlement A5, apparently indicating that the site constituted the fifth settlement surveyed and that the pottery found there indicated an ‘A-Group’ date. Other sequential coding systems were also developed: ‘IT’, for instance, meant ‘Isolated Tumulus’.​[78]​ Despite the universalist rhetoric of the Nubian campaign itself, archaeological precedent and routine meant that the survey understood Egyptian Nubia as a coherent and bounded whole even before it had started. The region’s past constituted a tangible product of an already existing recording system tied to national imperatives.​[79]​  




This outcome articulates with the ASI’s next move, emphasising just how little control UNESCO seemed to have over the Nubian fieldwork. Amongst other strategies, UNESCO encouraged the distribution of excavated objects from Egyptian Nubia as a means of getting foreign institutions to dig in the region. The organisation attempted to enforce the rule that items considered unnecessary for the “completion” of Egypt’s national collections might be exported to other nation-states through a process of division. By doing so, UNESCO again established the nation as a key unit of practice at the same time as it promoted a universalist vision of global cooperation.​[82]​ Yet the interaction of the ASI’s routinised field practices with Egyptian Nubian precedent suggests that other processes were also at play in the way that excavated objects—and the pasts that could be connected to them—became mobile. From the moment of excavation, the mutability of the objects dug and recorded by the ASI meant that these things became part of a scheme promoted by the Indian team, one that was at once national and transnational. When the ASI managed to export most of these things from the country, routinisation meant that they had long been ready to be part of this “Indian” transnational imaginary. 
Given the ASI’s regional ambitions, that imaginary unsurprisingly related to Dravidians. The Dravidians had long been a topic of interest in India and elsewhere. Emphasising the extent to which the spectre of racial politics suffused the Nubian campaign, a “Dravidian people” had been assumed since the early twentieth century to have comprised one race with the ancient Sumerians of Mesopotamia, and to have dwelt in both Sumer and the Indus Valley, now part of Pakistan.​[83]​ Post-independence, however, when enquiry into the Indian past took an increasing interest in the existence of a “Greater India”, it seems that mobilising the Dravidians constituted a particularly useful way of justifying the Afyeh work.​[84]​ Just before the ASI team left Egypt, The Times of India issued a report stating that:

A fascinating light on the unsolved mystery of the origin of the Dravidians may be thrown by the finds of an Indian archaeological mission which is due to sail home from Alexandria on May 4 with eight crateloads of rare Egyptian antiquities.

It is known that Dravidians were not the original inhabitants of India—but where did they come from?

Mr. B. Lal, director of the Indian School of Archaeology and leader of the five-man team, believes that his discoveries in Upper Egypt will help establish a significant link between the ancient Nubians of Africa and the early Dravidians of south India.

As the paper related, Lal’s belief was based on ‘several megalithic sites of ancient Nubians which bear an uncanny resemblance to cemeteries of early Dravidians which are found all over western India’. Indeed, ‘even earthen ring stands used by ancient Dravidians and Nubians to hold pots were identical’. 
Whilst The Times of India cautioned that ‘archaeological and anthropological research … will be necessary before this theory can be established with any certitude’,​[85]​ some time had been spent making sure that this research constituted a possibility, offering the chance to mobilise the Dravidians to India’s benefit. At the end of March 1962, Lal wrote that ‘one of the skeletons [from Tumas] has been lifted up in its original form, with a view to transporting it to India, if it is included in the Indian share’.​[86]​ A month later, after ‘a lot of manoeuvring’, it transpired that ‘the fate of the skeleton and two skulls, which has been hanging in the balance all these days, has … been decided … we have been permitted to remove [them]’.​[87]​ The objects from the ASI’s Egyptian dig were mutable, made by routine but also by choice. The parameters of the Nubian campaign had offered the chance to make research connected to them possible. 




The spectacle of the past—and the report in The Times of India discussed above—did its work. On 14 May 1962, even as the dig’s objects were still in transit, the work at Afyeh was responsible for a minor sensation in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Indian parliament, whose representatives had tabled questions about the dig. Many of the questions asked were procedural, relating to the costs of the work. But M. K. Kumaran, a member from Kerala, asked M. M. Das, the Deputy Minister of SRCA, ‘whether the report of the Mission throws any light on the probable relationship between the ancient Nubians and the Dravidians of India?’. Das told Kumaran that his question was ‘premature’. Not to be deterred, however, Hem Barua, the member for Gauhati in Assam, asked Humayun Kabir whether the work at Afyeh had confirmed either a geophysical or an archaeological ‘affinity’ between India and Egypt. Pressing the matter, Kumaran next asked ‘whether the Government have got any proposal before them to conduct excavations in south Arabia and southern Iran?’ in order to determine the relationship between ancient Nubians and Dravidians.​[90]​
	A transnational past encouraged a transnational future. Despite the caution expressed in May, on 19 June parliamentary questioning about the links of the Afyeh objects to Dravidians continued. Now, though, the Ministry of SRCA (using information supplied by the ASI), used the sensation caused by these things to its advantage. Humayun Kabir noted that ‘unless a great deal of further exploration is undertaken, especially in the intermediate areas [between India and Nubia], we cannot make any firm statements’.​[91]​ Further questions—and similar answers—occurred throughout the rest of the year.​[92]​ Meanwhile, away from the Lok Sabha, comments made at the eighteenth meeting of the Central Advisory Board for Archaeology in December 1962 emphasised the continued importance of Indian archaeological work abroad. In front of Egypt’s Cultural Attaché in India, Dr. Riad Eletr, the archaeologist and historian G. R. Sharma of the University of Allahabad ‘hoped that more foreign expeditions would be organised’. Meanwhile, the historian Niharranjan Ray of the University of Calcutta noted that ‘the School of Archaeology was a venture in the right direction and should soon develop into an Institute of Archaeology, by and on behalf of which foreign expeditions should be sent out’.​[93]​ The spectre of the Dravidians had worked its magic. By late 1963, at another meeting of the Central Advisory Board, a survey of the coastline between Egypt and India was proposed as a project that the ASI should undertake as part of India’s next Five-Year Plan.​[94]​
	Yet at the same time as these moves took place, the relationship between national, regional, and global ambitions met its match. The ASI continued to attempt to use India’s regional interests to its advantage, but simultaneously found itself undermined by the very structures that had previously allowed it to do so. Alongside the proposed coastline survey, the ASI had started to press its case to return to Nubia. Interestingly, UNESCO had tried to promote further Indian work in Egypt, but Amalananda Ghosh now turned down that possibility on the basis that the ‘sites [offered] were not even recommended for excavation by the party which had undertaken the preliminary survey work’.​[95]​ The Parisian institution’s authority continued to be far from total. Of far more interest, though, was the excavation of a site on the Sudanese side of the Nubian border. Lal had spent time in Britain after the Afyeh work had ended and, egged on by Wheeler, had suggested to Ghosh that work in Sudan was a real possibility.​[96]​ Wheeler was interested in promoting UNESCO’s Nubian campaign in general, and was concerned that ‘in 1964 the waters will begin to rise and it will be too late thereafter to do important work’.​[97]​ Ghosh now used Wheeler to make his case to his ministerial overlords, continuing the reassembly of the colonial networks of expertise that Wheeler represented.
	Ghosh asked Wheeler to write to Humayun Kabir in order that the ASI’s proposal might ‘receive weight’ with the minister.​[98]​ Agreeing to Ghosh’s request, Wheeler rehashed the sort of expertise-related argument that Kabir himself had made when writing to Vittorino Veronese when discussing the possibility of work in Egypt. First, that the ASI had ‘made a splendid impression in Egyptian Nubia’, suggesting that the Indians were now considered archaeological equals. Secondly, that because of ‘a number of very striking Middle Kingdom fortresses’ near Wadi Halfa, the ASI should work in Sudanese Nubia. Wheeler claimed that ‘no archaeological mission could deal with [such sites] more brilliantly … in view of … [the ASI’s] special experience of equivalent structures in India’.​[99]​ The ASI’s expertise had become a marketable asset in its own right, or so Wheeler suggested. And the claim persuaded Kabir to send a mission to Sudan (a member of the Non-Aligned Movement since 1961), provided that certain conditions were met. Kabir wanted to know precisely ‘what the last expedition cost, and what it achieved’.​[100]​  	
	Now, the ASI again emphasised the importance of understanding the regional nature of the Indian past. Finance, Ghosh argued in a memo outlining the situation, did not constitute an issue: the Afyeh expedition had spent under half of the budget available to it, which could now be used to work in Sudan. Meanwhile, the ASI stated that sending an expedition to Sudan would ‘indeed be in the fitness of things’ in terms of playing an equable role in the Nubian campaign. But beyond this rather predictable claim, what really seemed to matter to the ASI was not only creating ‘closer contacts between the Archaeological Survey of Sudan and our Survey’, but also

studying the antiquities in Sudanese Nubia, so as to find out if and how far they can be of help in working out a possible correlation between the C-Group material recently unearthed by our team in Egyptian Nubia and that from the megaliths of south India.​[101]​

A regional past mattered, as did a regional archaeological future, and mobilising the transnational spectre of the Dravidians helped to make these claims credible. 
Other issues, however, now made this regional deployment impossible. Initially, those issues were themselves regional. The short Sino-Indian War of October and November 1962 meant the ASI mission to Sudan was put on hold as part of a general moratorium.​[102]​ When, however, in the summer of 1963, the Ministry of SRCA revived its proposal to work in the country, the issues that affected this possibility had become rather more global, illustrating the way in which India’s policies were never that far removed from the multilateral vagaries of UNESCO’s Nubian campaign. 
At first, matters seemed like they would take a simple course. That April, The Illustrated London News published an article about Afyeh by Lal. The journal was a leading venue for the publication of archaeological work, and a key indicator that the discipline’s scientific claims were firmly connected to rather more popular—and deeply visual—means of communication.​[103]​ Wheeler wrote to comment that the article ‘makes a good show and … is a credit to you and to the Indian Government!’. Meanwhile, George F. Dales, the curator of the University of Pennsylvania Museum’s South Asian Section, wrote that the photos in the article ‘should prove to be a model for grave excavations for the other expeditions in Nubia’.​[104]​ For some, the ASI now stood in a strong position as a regional, if not global, leader in archaeological technique.





The ASI’s expedition to Afyeh constituted more than simply part of the country’s post-independence commitment to ideas and practices like non-alignment and development. Instead, the mission, building on similar contemporary work by the institution, constituted an attempt to formulate a new geography of scientific knowledge in which India’s expert handling of the past would lend it the ability to intervene across borders in regional presents and futures. Reassembling colonial geographies of archaeological knowledge, the dig at Afyeh constituted an attempt to redraw time and space in a manner pertinent to India’s regional interests, whether in the Middle East or in Asia. Post-excavation, the mobilisation of Dravidians as part of the discourse of the work not only made this objective clear, but also strengthened its force.
	In carrying out this strategy, India and the ASI were aided by UNESCO’s attempts to restructure the world in its own, multilateral image. Even as the Nubian campaign was dominated by the politics of the Cold War, its multilateral basis gave India a means to assert a regional scientific foothold. At the same time, UNESCO’s own influence in this situation was inconsistent. The organisation’s structures and the ability for others to undermine them seemed to lend India permission to work in prehistory at the same time (and for much the same reason) as denying Pakistan the right to conduct archaeological work in Egypt at all. Moreover, UNESCO’s lack of financial power seems to have put a stop to the ASI continuing its Nubian work in Sudan. UNESCO may have envisioned itself as (re-) ordering the world, but such events—alongside the continuation of racial and gender-based practices of archaeological fieldwork—suggest that the institution was far less powerful than often envisaged. 
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